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Natural Beauty, Ethics and Conceptions o f Nature
T he question  I will address is: To w hat ex ten t, and  in w hat sense, can 
n a tu ra l beauty he lp  establish ethical constrain ts on  o u r tre a tm e n t o f the 
na tu ra l environm ent? I will assum e fo r my discussion that n a tu ra l beauty  is 
som eth ing  real o r objective.1 A question central to my discussion, b u t whose 
answer I will largely take for gran ted , concerns the m arks o f n a tu ra l beauty, 
the characteristics th a t a na tu ra l reg ion  m ust possess in o rd e r to b e  b eau ti­
ful. It seem s to m e th a t one such characteristic is com plex order. This im­
plies th a t the cand idate  for natu ral beauty m ust be a whole o f in teg ra ted  
parts. T he beauty o f a natu ral reg ion  m ust requ ire  natu ra l biological diver­
sity, a lthough  the  degree  o f such diversity, and  o f complexity, will vary with 
location  and  clim ate. As these rem arks suggest, the focus o f  my discussion 
will be the beauty o f natu re  o r a natural region, n o t that o f individual things. 
Accordingly, the ethic based on  natu ra l beauty as I will discuss it will be con­
ce rn ed  with the trea tm en t o f n a tu re  o r  a natu ral region as a whole.
I. Natural Beauty and Preservation o f Nature
It is n o t unusual in literature on  environm ental ethics to m ain tain  that 
the aesthetic appreciation  o f n a tu re  can help  establish eth ical constrain ts 
on  hum an  actions affecting nature. Aldo Leopold sees natu ral beauty as one 
crite rion  o f ethics w hen he form ulates the princip le  o f his land  eth ic  as »A 
th ing  is righ t w hen it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and  beauty  o f 
th e  b io tic  com m unity . It is w ro n g  w hen  it ten d s  o th erw ise .« 2 E u g en e  
H argrove thinks th a t the failure am ong ancien t G reek ph ilosophers to lo­
cate beauty in the natu ra l env ironm ent helps explain their lack o f  concern  
for th a t env ironm en t.8
1 For a discussion of this issue and its relevance to environmental ethics, see for example 
Eugene C. H argrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N. 
J.:Prentice Hall, 1988), Ch. 6.
2 Aldo Leopold, A Sand County Almanac.And Sketches Here and There (New York:Oxford 
University Press, 1949), pp. 224-25.
3 Eugene C. Hargrove, op. cit., pp. 26-29.
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A ccording to him , an  arg u m en t establishing an ethical req u irem en t 
co n cern in g  the preservation o f na tu re  o r som e p art o f it can based be on  
its beauty  in m uch the sam e way in which one can argue from  the beauty  o f 
a work o f art to the necessity o f its preservation .4 To the ex ten t a work o f a rt 
is beautifu l an d  recognized as such, it is th o u g h t to possess a value w hich is 
in d e p e n d e n t o f its being  useful to obtain som e extraneous goal. For exam ­
ple, the  appreciation  o f a pain ting  as beautifu l does n o t involve a consid­
era tion  o f the econom ic benefits one m ight derive from  owning it an d  th en  
selling it. T he beauty o f  the pain ting  is considered  an intrinsic value, a value 
th a t o u g h t to be preserved  for its own sake. T h e  beauty o f a work o f art re ­
quires th a t the object be preserved in its cu rren t state and  that, in case o f 
dam age, it be restored  to its original state. H argrove and  o thers use sim ilar 
considerations to argue th a t we have a duty to preserve the natu ra l environ­
m en t o r  parts o f  it.5 N atural beauty is a non-instrum ental, in trinsic value 
w hich is lost in the case o f drastic change. F u rtherm ore , if, as positive aes­
thetics claim s,1’ beauty is som eth ing  original to a natu ra l reg ion  and  n a tu re  
u naffec ted  by hum ans has no negative aesthetic characteristics, th en  the 
beauty  o f  a natu ra l reg ion  m akes it a candidate for preservation in a cond i­
tion  in which it is unaffected  by hum ans. W ith the additional prem ise tha t 
natu ra l beauty is superior to the beauty o f art,7 the argum en t is th a t we o u g h t 
to preserve a natu ra l reg ion  in its original cond ition  because it is beautifu l 
in  th a t cond ition , and  this beauty is a value which som ehow  exceeds the 
beauty  o f  objects m ade by hum ans.
This argum en t, the  so-called »preservation argum ent« , calls fo r the 
exclusion o f all h um an  activity from  the natu ra l environm ent, with the  pos­
sible exception  o f low-impact recreational activities. U nderlying the  argu­
m en t is a dualistic view o f m an and  nature: m an and  na tu re  are  essentially 
distinct; all o r m ost hum an activity is detrim ental to the natural environm ent 
an d  its beauty. H argrove m akes this supposition  explicit: »In d efen d in g  
n a tu ra l beauty and  biodiversity, it is essential tha t the arg u m en t be devel­
op ed  in term s o f a hum an-natu re relationship in which hum ans are n o t part 
o f  na tu re , in which n a tu re  is viewed as an  other.«8 W estern approaches to
4 Eugene C. Hargrove, »The Paradox of Humanity:Two views o f biodiversity and 
landscapes«, in KeChungKim & Robert D. Weaver (eds.), Biodiversity and Landscapes: 
A Paradox of Humanity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 173-185. 
See also his Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Ch. 6, esp. pp. 191-98.
5 See for exam ple Robin A ttfield, Environmental Philosophy: Principlesand Prospects 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1994), pp. 183-202, esp. pp. 197-201.
6 For an account o f positive aesthetics, see Allen Carlson, »N ature and  Positive 
Aesthetics«, Environmental Ethics 6 (1984), pp. 5-34.
7 See Hargrove, op. cit., pp. 185-191.
8 Hargrove, ibid., p 183.
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n atu re  traditionally  fall into e ith e r o f two extrem es, both  o f  which p resu p ­
pose a duality o f m an and  natu re . O ne is the drastic transform ation  o f na­
ture, which has resu lted  in to-day’s environm ental crisis. M an obviously re­
gards him self as essentially distinct from  that which he destroys o r drastically 
alters. T he o th e r is the p ro tec tion  and  preservation o f na tu ra l areas to the 
exclusion o f all activity designed to m eet the needs o f h um an  life. T h e  pres­
ervation arg u m en t is, then , an  a ttem pt to justify the latter. It seeks to estab­
lish an  ethical req u irem en t th a t one refrain  from  using u n d is tu rb ed  n a tu ­
ral regions o r ecosystems and  tha t one restore som e areas th a t have been  
taken ou t o f their pristine condition  th ro u g h  hum an activity. U nderstood  
in this m anner, the argum en t is ind ifferen t to w hat hum ans do o r how h u ­
m ans live outside natu ra l areas, provided  their activities do  n o t adversely 
affect such areas, e.g. th rough  the use o f fossil fuels with the resu lting  pol­
lu tion  and  clim ate change. In o th e r words, the arg u m en t is n o t so m uch 
concerned  with h um an  lifestyles as with the confinem ent o f h u m an  life and  
activity to certain  locations o r regions. T he ethic tha t this a rg u m en t is de­
signed to su p p o rt does n o t call for the in tegration  o f h u m an  life an d  activ­
ity with the natu ra l environm ent.
T he approach  to na tu re  supported  by the preservation a rg u m en t dif­
fers from  w hat can be loosely characterized as sustainable uses of na tu re , an  
approach  to the natu ral environm ent that takes a m iddle course som ewhere 
betw een the  two traditional extrem es. A ccording to A rne Næss, ecological 
sustainability in w hat he calls the »wide sense« ensures the richness an d  di­
versity o f  life fo rm s on  E a r th .9 In  ac co rd an ce  w ith this c o n c e p tio n  o f 
sustainability, sustainable uses o f n a tu re  can be understood  as practices and  
activities th a t help  m eet the needs o f h um an  life, yet are consisten t with 
n a tu re ’s own requ irem en ts for its co n tin u ed  existence as an  in tricate  web 
o f diverse, in te rd ep en d en t things. Here, one m ight think o f hum ans as som e­
how living and  acting in nature , in conform ity with n a tu re ’s own conditions. 
Can considerations o f natu ral beauty su p p o rt this m iddle course an d  help  
establish an eth ic  requ iring  sustainable uses o f the natu ra l environm ent?
T he preservation  a rg u m en t is w eakened by the fact th a t th e re  is an 
essential d ifference betw een art and  natu re , which in tu rn  affects the con­
ditions u n d e r which each is beautiful. A work o f art is in an d  o f  itself static.
,J Arne Næss, »Deep Ecology for the Twenty-second Century«, in George Sessions (ed .), 
Deep Ecology for the Twenty-first Century (Boston & London:Sham bhala, 1995), p. 
464.Contrasted with sustainability in the wide sense is »narrow«, or perhaps »shallow«, 
ecological sustainability, which for Næss consists o f »the existence of short- and long- 
range policies that most researchers agree will make ecological catastrophes affecting 
narrow human interests unlikely.«
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T he goal o f  its p reservation is to m ake its beauty  perm an en t, to p ro tec t its 
beauty  from  externally  caused change. N atu re, on  the o th e r h an d , is dy­
nam ic; ecologists an d  geologists have em phasized  the fundam en tally  dy­
nam ic charac te r o f  natu ra l processes.10 If positive aesthetics is assum ed, this 
m eans th a t natu ra l beauty is n o t adverse to change, b u t m ust itself be con­
sidered  dynam ic. N atural change, fo r exam ple the gradual d ra in in g  an d  
eventual elim ination o f a beautiful lake or the natu ra l destruction  o f  a beau­
tiful forest, is com patible with natural beauty. N atural beauty canno t be m ade 
p e rm a n en t in the m an n er in which the beauty o f a work o f a rt is m ade per­
m an en t th rough  restoration and  protection. In a recen t article, Keekok Lee 
discusses the  m easures o f the N ational Trust in E ng land’s Lake D istrict to 
resto re  and  p ro tec t Yew Tree Tarn from  destruc tion  caused by geological 
processes, in o rd e r to m ake its beauty p e rm a n en t.11 However, such a m eas­
u re  am ounts to the so rt o f in te rfe ren ce  with n a tu re  which the p ro p o n en ts  
o f  the preservation arg u m en t want to reject.
Given its dynam ic character, natu ra l beauty can n o t su p p o rt n a tu ra l 
preservation in the sense o f m aintain ing a natu ral region in its p resen t state. 
Rather, as a foundation  for environm ental ethics, na tu ra l beauty w ould dic­
tate th a t natu ral processes be allowed to ru n  their course, on  n a tu re ’s own 
term s. Does this p reclude all uses o f na tu re  for productive purposes to m eet 
the needs o f  h um an  life? Leopold distinguishes betw een evolutionary, na tu ­
ral change, and  the sort o f change hum ans are capable o f affecting by m eans 
o f  advanced technology. N atural change is usually slow o r local; an th ro p o ­
genic change, using advanced technology, can be swift an d  global.12 Using 
the  distinction, one  can perhaps say that acting and  living in a m an n er con­
sistent with natu ral beauty involves m ain tain ing  the h um an  im pact on  na­
tu re  a t the  level or scale o f n a tu re ’s own changes an d  processes, slow o r lo­
cal. N atural beauty allows for hum an  uses o f na tu re  insofar as those uses are 
n o  m ore than  form s o f partic ipation  in n a tu re ’s own dynam ic processes.
10 For a discussion of recent ecology’s view of the dynamic character of natural processes, 
see J. Baird Callicott, »Do Deconstructive Ecology and Sociobiology U nderm ine 
Leopold’s Land Ethic?«, Environmental Ethics 18 (1996), pp. 353-372; Donald Worster, 
»The Ecology of O rder and Chaos«, in Worster, The Wealth of Nature (NewYork:Oxford 
University Press, 1993), pp. 157-170.
11 Keekok Lee, »Beauty for Ever?«, Environmental Values4 (1995), pp. 213-225.
12 Ibid., pp. 216-217; cf. Callicott, op.cit., pp. 369-372.Callicott expresses the distinction 
in term s of the ecological concept o f scale, a concept which is both tem poral and 
spatial.
294
Natural Beauty, Ethics and Conceptions o f Nature
II. Conceptions o f Nature
Som e ecologists and  env ironm enta l ph ilosophers view n a tu re  o r  an  
ecosystem e ith e r as an  organism  o r as a com m unity.1* In  e ith e r case, n a tu re  
is reg ard ed  as a  com plex  orderly  whole, being  in som e sense self-determ in- 
ing. It was suggested earlier th a t n a tu re  o r a natu ral region is n o t beautifu l 
unless it is a com plex orderly  whole. However, the norm ative im plications 
o f n a tu ra l beauty  an d  the status th a t hum ans are reg ard ed  as having with 
respect to n a tu re  will vary, d ep en d in g  on  w hether n a tu re  is viewed as an 
organism  o r as a com m unity, respectively.
I t follows from  the  view o f n a tu re  as an  organism  th a t  the  w hole o f 
n a tu re  o r o f  an  ecosystem is regarded  as having prim acy in re la tion  to n a tu ­
ral individuals an d  species. Since the parts, like the organs, a re  considered  
significant o r  valuable only as they con tribu te  to the whole o r  its well-being, 
the parts o f  natu re , such as its species and  individual organism s, do  n o t have 
in d e p e n d e n t status o r value ap a rt from  the whole. T he beauty  o f  n a tu re  
viewed as an  organism  seems unprob lem atic . An individual o rganism  can  
be considered  beautifu l and  can be said to re ta in  its beauty  th ro u g h  the 
course o f  its developm ent. O n the o th e r hand , the organism  view has im ­
plications w hich may be unacceptab le , o r  at least problem atic . Since any 
value o f  the p a r t o f  an  organism  depends on  its function  w ithin the  w hole, 
it is difficult to say o f  a natu ral individual th a t it is beautifu l in  its own right, 
in d ep en d en tly  o f  its con tribu tion  to the natu ra l whole. Yet, m any n a tu re  
lovers seem  to find  beauty in  individual plants and  anim als as such. A n o th er 
im plication concerns the status o f hum ans with respect to the  natu ra l whole. 
If  one holds a m onist view o f m an and  natu re , considering  m an as p a rt o f 
n a tu re , th en  the  h u m an  individual an d  the  h u m an  species ca n n o t be  re ­
garded  as having a status o r value ind ep en d en tly  o f their being  p a rt o f  the 
whole. Thus, one  can n o t m ake sense o f the w orth o r  dignity o f  the h u m an  
individual o r o f  hum anity.14 F urtherm ore , one  can n o t claim  au tonom y o r 
m oral responsib ility  fo r h u m an  persons o r g roups o f  persons, fo r every 
hum an action is considered part o f the organic process. In o th er words, view­
ing the h u m an  being  as part o f n a tu re  conceived as an  organism  is incom ­
patible with the status o f the hum an  person as a m oral agent. H ere , a m onist
13 Leopold and Næss tend to view nature or ecosystems according to a com m unity 
conception. Lovelock’s »Gaia hypothesis« is a version o f the organism  view. For a 
discussion of these as two alternative, com peting holistic models o f nature, see Eric 
Katz, »Organism, Community, and the ‘Substitution P roblem ’«, in Katz, Nature as 
Subject (Lanham , MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 1997), pp. 33-52.
14 In my view, the idea of hum an dignity or worth is too fundam ental to ethical and 
legal thinking to be summarily dismissed.
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view o f m an and  na tu re , in u n d erm in in g  the idea o f m orality altogether, 
ru les o u t natu ra l beauty as a foundation  for m oral obligation with respect 
to  the natu ra l environm ent.
T he alternative, given the organism  view, is to m aintain  a dualistic view 
o f  m an and  natu re . If the h um an  being  is n o t p a r t o f  the na tu ra l w hole, 
viewed as an organism , it is possible to m aintain  tha t the h um an  being  has 
in d e p e n d e n t status an d  value, and  that he has m oral responsibility an d  so, 
as a m oral agent, is subject to m oral obligation. And it makes sense to con­
sider h u m an  activity as som eth ing  distinct from  and  capable o f being  con­
trary to natu ra l processes an d  to pass ethical ju d g m en t on  h u m an  actions 
accordingly. E nvironm ental ethics based on natu ral beauty, w here n a tu re  is 
conceived as an  organism , supposes tha t the h um an  being is essentially dis­
tin c t an d  separate  from  natu re . In tha t case, na tu ra l beauty  im poses on  
hum ans the obligation to refrain  from  in terfering  with that from  which they 
are essentially distinct. This is in agreem ent with the preservation argum ent.
An alternative to the  organism  view is the view o f n a tu re  o r an  ecosys­
tem  as a com m unity. For characteristics o f com m unity, one often  looks to 
h u m an  com m unities: the association o f people u n d er some political au th o r­
ity, religious com m unities, com m unities based on som e core activity o r busi­
ness such as a fishing com m unity, and  so on. Since n a tu re  o r an  ecosystem 
is n o t characterized  by the kind o f cooperation  and  m utual obligation  th a t 
o n e  finds in  h u m an  com m unities, it m ust be considered  suffic ient fo r a 
natural com m unity that its m em bers in teract and  influence one an o th er and  
th a t they share in the sam e fundam ental conditions o f existence an d  life.15 
Even if the m em bers o f one species prey on  those o f another, this is neces­
sary for the thriving o f  the anim als th a t survive, an d  they do so u n d e r  re ­
lated conditions. T he com m unity view o f natu re  supposes that natural things 
in  th e ir g reat diversity are som ehow  connected . However, a com m unity  is a 
looser association o f things than  an organism . A com m unity m em b er may 
have a significant function  with respect to the whole and  yet have in d ep en d ­
e n t status or value. W hen contrasting the com m unity view o f natu re  with the 
organism  view, Eric Katz uses a university as an  exam ple o f com m unity  to 
m ake this p o in t.1(i S tudents, faculty and  staff who are essential to the univer­
sity com m unity  also have lives and  activities ap a rt from  it.
15 John  Passmore, Man ’s Responsibility for Nature ( Ne w Yo rk : Sc ri b n e r, 1974), p. 116, objects 
to the community view of nature on the grounds that it is a necessary condition for 
there being a com munity that those who count as its m em bers recognize m utual 
obligations. As Callicott points out in his In Defense of the Land Ethic. Essays in 
Environmental Philosophy (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1989), p. 71, a 
com m unity view of nature must reject Passm ore’s condition.
16 Katz, op. cit., pp. 57-58.
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If these characterizations o f com m unity  and  com m unity  m em bers are 
correct, th en  this view o f natu re  does n o t have the problem atic im plications 
o f the organism  view. It allows for the individual th ing in n a tu re  to be con­
sidered  beautiful in its own right, and  n o t only in term s o f its function  within 
the whole. This view also allows for a m onist view o f the re la tionsh ip  o f m an 
an d  natu re , accord ing  to which hum ans are m em bers o f the  n a tu ra l com ­
munity, w ithout relinquish ing  the view o f the hum an  person as valuable and  
as m orally responsible. Leopold  regards h um an  m em bersh ip  in th e  n a tu ­
ral com m unity  as a presupposition  o f his land  ethic. He construes the  evo­
lu tion  o f ethics as a gradual developm ent from  its concern  with the  re la tion  
o f  o n e  individual to another, th ro u g h  a concern  with the re la tion  o f  the 
individual to society to a concern  with h u m an s’ re la tion  to the  land  an d  the 
things living on  it, i.e., the land  e th ic .17 A ccording to him , the  last stage will 
be a reality w hen hum ans, as m oral agents, view land  as a com m unity  to 
which they belong, together with all o th er living th ings.18 For L eopold , the 
h u m an  person  is n o t p rep ared  to follow an eth ic based on  na tu ra l beauty 
unless he realizes th a t he  is a m em ber o f a natu ra l com m unity.
III. Natural Beauty, Place and Landscape
O ne prob lem  with the com m unity view and  the idea o f  na tu ra l beauty 
is th a t a com m unity  is n o t the so rt o f  th ing  tha t is co n sid ered  beautifu l. 
W hereas it m akes sense to speak o f n a tu re  as a »beautiful organism «, it is 
n o t so obvious th a t it m akes sense to characterize n a tu re  as a »beautiful 
com m unity.« If  natu ra l beauty can justify  an ethic co n cern in g  h u m an s’ re ­
lationship  to the natu ra l environm ent, the question is how this is so, when 
the com m unity  view o f na tu re  is presupposed . O ne reason why a com m u­
nity is n o t the sort o f th ing tha t is considered  beautiful is th a t it is n o t a m ere 
aggregate o f its m em bers. A com m unity also involves the com plex  re la tion ­
ships o f its m em bers and  the conditions o f their coexistence. Such re la tion ­
ships an d  conditions are grasped intellectually; they are n o t directly  per­
ceived b u t in fe rred  from  w hat is perceived. W riters on n a tu ra l aesthetics 
generally agree tha t perceptual qualities o f  natural p h en o m en a  are relevant 
to their being  beautifu l o r objects o f aesthetic ap p rec ia tio n .19 If a com m u-
17 Leopold, op. cit., pp. 202-203.
18 Ibid., p. viii.
1!l I make this claim on the basis o f writings by people of diverse orientations on natural 
aesthetics:Arnold Berleant, »The Aesthetics o f Art and Nature«, in Salim Kelam & 
Ivan Gaskell (eds.), Landscape, Natural Beauty and the Arts (Cambridge: Cam bridge
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nity is, a t least in part, an  intellectually grasped entity, natu ra l beauty  m ust 
p erta in  to percep tual aspects, i.e., w hat can be seen, heard , felt, etc., o f  the 
n a tu ra l com m unity.
As objects o f  percep tion , it is typically uniquely  identifiable particulars 
th a t are considered beautiful: individual animals, particular places an d  land­
scapes. Perhaps one can also say that the beauty o f a particu lar na tu ra l p h e ­
n o m en o n  is as u n ique as the particu lar itself. If positive aesthetics is true, 
two natu ra l landscapes, sim ilar o r dissimilar, are bo th  beautiful and  th e re ­
fore o f equal aesthetic value. Yet, each is beautifu l in its particu lar m anner, 
by virtue o f  its u n iq u e  character, so tha t the beauty o f one is n o t exchange­
able for the beauty o f the o ther. T he elim ination o f one landscape w ould 
then  be an  absolute, irreplaceable, loss. A place, landscape or natura l region 
is d ep e n d en t for its beauty on the kinds o f p lants and  anim als and  types o f 
soil and  rocks th a t are natu ra l to it. Callicott, with re ference to L eopold , 
suggests that certain  species o f plants and  anim als m ight be m ore cen tra l 
to the beauty o f a reg ion  than  others, such as the ruffed  grouse in the  n o rth  
woods o f Wisconsin and  the alligator in the Louisiana swamps. H e calls these 
»aesthetic ind icato r species«.211 Since, as ecology tells us, an  ecosystem is an  
in tricate  web o f in te rd e p en d en t things, the aesthetic ind icato r species re ­
qu ire  th e ir su p p o rtin g  species and  p h en o m en a . T he u n iq u e  beauty  and  
ch arac te r o f a natu ra l area requires the presence o f all the species o f p lants 
an d  anim als and  all the soil and  rock types th a t are natu ra l o r orig inal to it.
H um an  com m unities were originally attached  to specific places o r re­
gions, whose conditions were central to the determ ina tion  o f the individual 
ch arac te r o f  the com m unity. A small fishing village at a particu lar coastal 
location  has its charac te r to a great ex ten t d e term in ed  by the conditions o f  
th a t particu la r location: the presence o f certain  species o f fish, prevailing 
w eather conditions, soil conditions, the su rro u n d in g  landscape such as the 
p resence o r absence o f forests nearby, the proxim ity to o th e r villages, the 
topography, and  so on. A nd for its survival, the com m unity has organized  
its activities so as tp be in ag reem en t with the natu ra l conditions o f its loca­
tion. A natural com m unity is similar in that it too is attached to a certain place 
an d  region, whose peculiar conditions and  characteristics help  d e term in e  
its u n iq u e  character, includ ing  the diversity an d  relationships o f its m em -
University Press, 1993), pp. 228-243; Emily Brady, »Imagination and the Aesthetic 
A ppreciation o f Nature«, The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 56 (1998),pp. 139- 
147; J. Baird Callicott, »The Land Aesthetic«, in Callicott (ed.), Companion to 'A Sand 
County Almanac’. Interpretive and Critical Essays (Madison: University o f Wisconsin Press, 
1987), pp. 157-171.
20 Callicott, »The Land Aesthetic«, pp. 166-167; cf. Leopold, op.cit., pp.137-138.
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bers. A p articu lar place, landscape o r reg ion  possesses diverse p ercep tu a l 
qualities, and  it is a com plex orderly  whole. Thus, a place, landscape o r  re ­
gion satisfies a t least som e o f the conditions for possessing na tu ra l beauty. 
It is reasonable to think, then  tha t if n a tu re  is viewed as a com m unity, n a tu ­
ral beauty perta ins to the place, landscape o r reg ion  in w hich the com m u­
nity is located.
A ccording to dynamic ecology, a place in natu re  o r a natu ra l landscape 
has a history which accounts for its u n ique character. As such, every place 
o r reg ion  em bodies its distinctive narrative, a story o f its developm enta l 
stages an d  th e ir significance. T he story is ab o u t the reciprocal in fluence o f 
residen t species and  the places and  regions in which they are  located . H u­
m ans can re la te to such a narrative in e ith er o f two ways. T hey have the  ca­
pacity to d isrup t the narrative so as to d iscontinue it, o r they can, th ro u g h  
th e ir  ac tions, co n tin u e  the  n arra tive . N e ith e r N æ ss’ d e e p  ecology n o r  
L eo p o ld ’s lan d  eth ic  prohib its h u m an  hab itation  in and  in terac tio n  with 
natu re . A ccording to Næss, h um an  activities or hum an  hab ita tion  n eed  n o t 
be incom patib le with wilderness; only certain  lifestyles are, especially those 
o f W estern industrial peop le.21 A nd accord ing  to Leopold, the lan d  ethic 
does n o t oppose hum an activity in the natural environm ent, only the destruc­
tion o f this environm ent.22 Indeed, a truly holistic ethic o f nature , which seeks 
to in tegrate  hum ans in the natu ral whole, can n o t p ro h ib it h u m an  uses o f 
na tu re , provided these uses are sustainable in the relevant sense an d  are 
confined  in scope so as to be in conform ity with n a tu re ’s orig inal processes. 
T he idea o f n a tu ra l beauty can he lp  su p p o rt these ethical constra in ts on 
hum an  activity in nature .
If, as positive aesthetics holds, a place o r landscape is naturally  o r  origi­
nally beautiful, and , as dynam ic ecology holds, it is subject to con tinuous 
processes o r evolutionary changes, the results o f which are also beautifu l, 
th en  natu ral beauty requires o f hum ans tha t they co n d u c t their lives in a 
m an n er w hich is consisten t with n a tu re ’s own processes. In  o th e r  words, 
an th ropogen ic changes, which are inevitable, given the presence o f  hum ans 
on  Earth, m ust be such that they do n o t upset n a tu re ’s own course. H um an 
activity m ust be governed by a concern  for the particular place o r landscape 
where the natural com m unity is located. For example, forestry practices m ust 
be d e term in ed  accord ing  to the charac te r o f the place, such as its topogra­
phy, soil conditions, living conditions o f residen t species, an d  so on. A road  
built in hilly coun try  m ust be narrow  and  winding. Farm ing practices m ust
21 Næss, »The T hird  World, Wilderness, and Deep Ecology«, in George Sessions (ed.), 
Deep Ecology for the Twenty-first Century, p. 398.
22 Leopold, op.cit., p. 204.
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leave hab ita t for residen t species, although the m an n er in which this is done 
will dep en d  on climatic arid soil conditions, on  w hat the resident species are, 
an d  so on. Since a place o r a landscape is like no  other, its beauty requ ires 
o f  hum ans tha t th e ir activities m aintain  its uniqueness. R ather than  exclud­
ing hum ans from  the natural environm ent, an  ethic based on  natura l beauty 
in this m an n er imposes requirem ents on hum ans’ lifestyles, that h um an  lives 
an d  activities be d e te rm in ed  by the ch arac te r o f the place o r landscape, 
ra th e r  than  the o th er way around.
A ccording to some proponen ts o f positive aesthetics, the aesthetic ap­
preciation o f nature requires scientific knowledge, the knowledge of a reg ion ’s 
o r landscape’s natural history.23 Such a requ irem en t seems counterintuitive 
and  unreasonable, for it would imply that persons w ithout the prerequisite 
knowledge of a  certain  region are incapable o f aesthetic appreciation o f that 
reg ion .24 O n the o th e r hand , such knowledge is useful, and  may even be nec­
essary, for conform ing to the requirem ents im posed by natural beauty. T he 
req u irem en t that hum an activity be in conform ity with n a tu re ’s own dynam ic 
processes is a requ irem en t that hum an activity be part o f and  a con tinuation  
o f  a narrative which is already presen t as em bodied  in the natural environ­
m ent. Knowledge o f the history of a place o r landscape is relevant to d eter­
m ining  w hat is involved in complying with the ethical requirem ent.
T h e  place o r landscape in which a particu lar natu ra l com m unity  is lo­
cated  is n o t any place, determ inable by m eans o f abstract coordinates alone. 
Rather, it holds a special significance to that com m unity  and  its m em bers. 
T hus, th ere  is a sense in which the place o r landscape o f a natu ra l com m u­
nity  is h o m e to th a t com m unity  an d  its m em bers. As Edw ard Casey has 
p o in ted  out, the idea o f  hom e signifies an in tim ate re la tionship  th a t a p er­
son o r g roup  o f persons has to a particu lar p lace.25 H om e is th a t particu lar 
place to which one  belongs. It is p art o f o n e ’s identity, and  the distinctive 
ch a rac te r o f  the hom e itself comes from  o n e ’s living in it. T hus conceived, 
a hom e is som eth ing  very d ifferen t from  a house. W hereas o n e ’s hom e is 
o n e ’s dwelling in a fundam en tal sense, a house is a construction , a d istinct 
o th er to which one has a merely external relationship. T he relation to a place 
as o n e ’s hom e in this sense is a basis for o n e ’s caring for it, m aking sure it 
persists in its distinctive existence and  significance. Similarly, if the idea  o f 
h om e is app lied  to the place o r region o f a na tu ra l com m unity, w hich in-
23 See for example Allen Carlson, op.cit. Callicott attributes a similar view to Leopold, 
cf. Callicott, »The Land Aesthetic«, pp. 161-166.
24 For an extensive criticism of this view, see for example Emily Brady, op.cit.
25 Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 
e.g. pp. 121, 175-77.
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eludes hum ans am ong  its m em bers, it m akes sense to  ex ten d  the  sam e con­
siderations o f  care to this place o r region. T he w ord »ecology« is derived 
from  the  an c ien t G reek words »oikos«, o ften  transla ted  as »hom e«, an d  
»logos«.20 Accordingly, ecology is the study o f  the natu ral hom e, includ ing  
the things inhab iting  it and  the relationships o f their in terdependence . T he 
na tu ra l hom e has its beauty from  all the things tha t naturally  live in  it and  
belong  to it. As an  intrinsic value, na tu ra l beauty requ ires o f  the  m orally 
capable m em bers o f  the natu ra l com m unity tha t they care fo r the h o m e o f 
all the com m unity ’s m em bers, tha t they act so as to enable it to co n tin u e  to 
exist with its distinctive character.
IV. Conclusion
In opposition  to the preservation argum ent, I do n o t th ink  th a t n a tu ­
ral beauty  p ro h ib its  h u m an  uses o f n a tu re  altogether, w hen n a tu re  o r a 
na tu ra l region is viewed as a com m unity o f which hum ans are  m em bers. It 
does n o t follow, however, tha t there  is no  obligation to preserve wilderness 
areas in  various parts o f the world. Som e o f the considerations I have p re ­
sen ted  can also be used in su p p o rt o f  w ilderness preservation. A lthough 
natu ra l com m unities o r ecosystems are distinguishable entities, they m ust 
still be connected . T he distinct com m unities and  th e ir respective m em bers 
m ust som ehow  in terac t o r relate to one an o th e r across com m unity  b o u n d a­
ries, for they all exist in one inescapable world, Earth. Insofar as o n e  can 
speak o f  a global natu ra l com m unity, the beauty o f  na tu re  thus conceived 
is the beauty o f Earth. If positive aesthetics is assum ed, th en  E arth  with its 
original biological diversity is beautiful. If natu ra l beauty is a fou n d a tio n  o f 
an  eth ic  o f na tu re , th en  such beauty on  a global scale im plies th a t hum ans 
shou ld  no t, th ro u g h  drastic in te rfe ren ce  with natu ral processes, u p se t the 
conditions o f E a rth ’s original biological diversity. Failure to preserve vari­
ous kinds o f  w ilderness w ould dim inish this diversity. Thus, the  appeal to 
natu ral beauty can sup p o rt an  ethic o f n a tu re  at the global level as well as at 
the  local o r  regional level.27
2fi For an account of the origin of the word »ecology«, see for example J. Donald Hughes, 
Ecology in Ancient Civilizations (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1975), 
pp. 2-3.
27 I am grateful to O tto M. Christensen for conversations about issues o f aesthetics.
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